Danny P. Daley v. Lisa D. Daley : Reply Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1997
Danny P. Daley v. Lisa D. Daley : Reply Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Paul G. Amann; Attorney for Appellee.
John E. Schindler; Attorney for Appellant.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Daley v. Daley, No. 970349 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1997).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/919
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BRIEF 
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
K F U 
50 
A10 
DOCKET NO. 110?>Wr/k 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DANNY P. DALEY, 
Plaintiff/APPELLANT, 
vs. 
LISA D. DALEY, 
Defendant/APPELLEE. 
REPLY OF APPELLANT 
Priority of Argument: 4 
Case No. 970349CA 
REPLY OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JUDGE BRUCE K. HALLIDAY 
PAUL G. AMANN 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 359-2230 
Fax: (801) 323-0822 
Attorney for APPELLEE 
JOHN E. SCHINDLER (#3619) 
80 West Main, Suite 201 
Price, Utah 84501 
Telephone: (801) 637-1783 
Fax: (801) 637-0220 
Attorney for Plaintiff/APPELLANT 
FILED 
FEB 1 7 1998 
COURT OF APPEALS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page Number 
1. Introduction 1 
2. Argument 2-9 
3. Conclusion 10 
4. Addendum 11 
-Exhibit 1 - Prosecution 
-Exhibit 2 - Memorandum Decision 
-Exhibit 3 - Findings of Fact 
-Exhibit 4 - Decree 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASE 
Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166 (Utah App. 1990) 
Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah App. 1993) 
Hill v. Hill, 869 P.2d 963 (Utah App. 1994) 
Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, 599 P.2d 510 (Utah 1979) 
Thronson v. Thronson, 810 P.2d 428 (Utah App. 1981) 
Willey v. Willey, 914 P.2d 1149 (Utah App. 1996) 
INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiff submits the following REPLY BRIEF pursuant to Rule 24 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. As required by said Rule Plaintiff 
will address only new matters submitted by Defendant's BRIEF. Plaintiff 
submits that there are six (6) items to be addressed: 
1. Defendant's reference to th< refusal of the Emery County 
Attorney to prosecute Plaintiff (Defendant's Brief at page 7); 
2. Defendant's reference to implied findings of fact (Defendant's 
Brief at page 9); 
3. Defendant's assertion that this Court cannot award custody to 
Plaintiff (Defendant's Brief at page 10); 
4. Defendant's citation of authority concerning her argument 
regarding the tax dependency issue (Defendant's Brief at page 14); 
5. Defendant's assertion that the trial court's division of property 
and allocation of debt were within acceptable limits (Defendant' Brief 
pages 16-19 under paragraphs numbered 8-10); 
6. Defendant's argument concerning Dr. Burgess' fee 
1 
(Defendant's Brief at page 20). 
ARGUMENT 
ITEM1 
Prosecution by Emery County 
At page 7 of her BRIEF Defendant references the failure of the 
Emery County Attorney's Office to prosecute Plaintiff for statutory rape. 
While this case was pending in the District Court the Defendant's 
counsel tendered an opinion that criminal conduct had occurred by the 
Plaintiff. See attached in the Addendum as Exhibit la. This 
correspondence was submitted to the Emery County Attorney. Attached 
as Exhibit lb is the initial response of the Deputy Emery County 
Attorney. 
Apparently, further information was submitted to the Emery County 
Attorney. Mary Manley, Deputy Emery County Attorney, indicated to 
Defendant, through counsel, that no prosecution would occur. That 
correspondence is attached as Exhibit lc. 
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ITEM 2 
Implied Findings of Fact 
At page nine (9) of her BRIEF Defendant argues that the trial court 
imphcitly made certain factual findings. Defendant argues that the trial 
court imphcitly found that the parties were capable of implementing joint 
custody because he ordered joint custody. 
Implicit factual findings have been discussed by this court. In 
WiUey v. WiUey, 914 P.2d 1149 (Utah App. 1996) this court accepted 
an imphed finding that Ms. Willey was voluntarily underemployed. The 
leading case on imphed findings is HaU v. HaU, 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah 
App. 1993). In HaU Judge Orme, writing for a unanimous court, said, 
"Unstated findings can be implied if it is reasonable to 
assume that the trial court actually considered the 
controverted evidence and necessarily made a finding to 
resolve the controversy, but simply failed to record the 
factual determination it made." 
In this case the trial court made a finding "that joint custody is 
generally not appropriate where the parties, as here is evident have strong 
disagreements between each other... ." (emphasis added) (FINDINGS 
3 
OF FACT, 4th unnumbered paragraph of paragraph 2 on page 3 of the 
FINDINGS, transcript page 0369)1 
Plaintiff argues this explicit finding made by the trial court is 
contrary to the finding required by UCA Section 30-3-10.2 that "both 
parties appear capable of implementing joint legal custody." There is no 
basis to assume that the trial court made an implicit finding. Actually, the 
trial court found that the parties were not capable of implementing joint 
custody. 
This court discussed implementation of joint custody over objection 
of a party in Thronson v. Thronson, 810 P.2d 428 (Utah App. 1991). 
In Thronson the trial court made a similar finding - that "there exists 
substantial difficulty between the parties". The Thronson court held that 
the trial court abused its discretion by imposing joint legal custody. In 
remanding the case this court said the "choice in competing child custody 
claims should instead be based on function-related factors." 
'The MEMORANDUM DECISION and FINDINGS OF FACT are attached in the 
ADDENDUM hereto as Exhibits 2 and 3 respectively. 
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Continuing, this court said, "As a result, the findings herein will not 
support an ultimate finding under Section 30-3-10 that child custody 
should be placed with one parent or the other." 
Plaintiff submits there is no basis to conclude that the trial court 
herein made any "implicit findings". 
ITEM 3 
Direct Entry of Judgment 
Defendant argues, at page 10 of her BRIEF, that this court should 
return the matter to the trial court rather that direct entry of custody to 
Plaintiff. Plaintiff has requested that this court award him custody of 
Cory. This court has, on many occasions, indicated its authority to direct 
an entry of judgment and has exercised that authority. In Willey, supra. 
this court said, 
Notwithstanding this, the right of review on appeal has its 
purposes. . . . [This court] would be remiss in its 
responsibility and this assured right of appeal would be 
meaningless if it unquestioningly accepted all actions of the 
trial court and remained insensitive to pleas to rectify 
inequity or injustice. Consequently, the rule is that when it 
is made to appear that the court has failed to correctly apply 
principles of law or equity,... or that the judgment has so 
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failed to do equity that it manifests a clear abuse of 
discretion, this court on review will take appropriate 
corrective action in the interests of justice. 
Continuing, Willey stated, 
Rather than remanding again for the trial court to examine 
these same issues, we will exercise our equitable power to 
review the evidence directly regarding equitable matters, 
and to make the necessary findings on the issues not reached 
by the trial court. See Owen v. Owen, 579 P.2d 911, 913 
(Utah 1978) (noting that appellate court can review evidence 
and make its own findings in divorce proceeding, which is 
in equity); see also Thompson v. Thompson, 709 P.2d 360, 
361 (Utah 1985) (per curiam) ("On appeal, we have broad 
equitable powers and are not necessarily bound or limited by 
the trial court's findings."); Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P.2d 
669, 671 (Utah 1985) ("In reviewing a trial court's actions 
in a divorce case, we are vested with broad equitable 
powers."). To do otherwise would subject both parties to the 
unwarranted necessity of once again presenting these 
questions to the trial court. 
It is interesting to note that in Willey this court seemed inclined to 
direct an award of custody; however, after complete review, decided to 
remand the issue. This observation is based on the statement that "As a 
result, the findings herein will not support an ultimate finding under 
Section 30-3-10 that child custody should be placed with one parent of 
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the other." 
In Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, 599 P.2d 510 (Utah 1979) the court 
said, "Only where trial court action is so flagrantly unjust as to constitute 
an abuse of discretion should the appellate forum interpose its own 
judgment." Plaintiff submits the trial court's action in this case 
concerning custody is "so flagrantly unjust as to constitute an abuse of 
discretion". 
Plaintiff submits that the FINDINGS of the trial court would 
support an award of custody by this court to Plaintiff. For the reasons 
stated in Plaintiffs BRIEF Plaintiff submits that this court should award 
him custody of his son. 
ITEM 4 
Equitable Division 
Defendant argues in paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 on pages 16-19 of her 
BRIEF that the trial court's division of property and allocation of debt are 
within acceptable limits of the trial court's discretion. 
The methodology of division of property and allocation of debt are 
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indicated in Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166 (Utah App. 1990) and HaU v. 
Hall, 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah App. 1993). In Burt this court said that 
"equity should be the watchword as the trial court apportions property... 
." Continuing, this court said, 
On remand, the court should first properly categorize the 
parties' property as part of the marital estate or as the 
separate property of one or the other. Each party is 
presumed to be entitled to all of his or her separate property 
and fifty percent of the marital property. But rather than 
simply enter such a decree, the court should then consider 
the existence of exceptional circumstances and, if any be 
shown, proceed to effect an equitable distribution in light of 
those circumstances and in conformity with our decision. 
That having been done, the final step is to consider whether, 
following appropriate division of the property, one party or 
the other is entitled to alimony. 
In Hall v. Hall, supra, this court said, 
Absent findings that would justify departure from the 
presumptive rule of equal distribution, we reverse and 
remand to give the trial judge an opportunity to enter 
findings supporting the unequal distribution,...." 
Plaintiff asserts that the trial court abused its discretion concerning 
division of property and allocation of debt. 
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ITEM 5 
Tax Dependent 
On this issue Plaintiff notes that Defendant cites Hill v. Hill, 869 
P.2d 963 (Utah App. 1994) as authority to support the trial court's ruling. 
Plaintiff notes that the Hill case predates UCA Section 78-45-7.21 and is, 
therefore, inapposite. 
ITEM 6 
Burgess Fee 
The trial court ordered Plaintiff to pay the fee for the custody 
evaluation when the evaluation was ordered. That fee was paid by the 
Plaintiff. The fee that Plaintiff was ordered in the Decree to pay is with 
reference to Dr. Burgess's presence in court on May 2,1996. Plaintiff, 
by this portion of his REPLY, wants to make it clear that the trial court's 
FINDING in paragraph 29 (transcript page 0384) and DECREE2 in 
paragraph 26 (transcript page 0397) was with reference to her presence 
on that day as the cost of the evaluation had already been paid by 
2The Decree is attached in the Addendum as Exhibit 4. 
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Plaintiff. Plaintiff's payment to Dr. Burgess for the evaluation was made 
before the evaluation was released and deposited with the trial court. 
Plaintiff made no further requests of Dr. Burgess and, also, made no 
payment to her. 
Dr. Burgess' presence on May 2,1996 was entirely the request of 
Defendant. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff requests the relief indicated in his BRIEF. 
DATED this 17 day of / ^ , 1998. 
J ( 3 H N E . SCHINDLER 
Attorney for Plaintiff APPELLANT 
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ADDENDUM 
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EXHIBIT 1 - PROSECUTION 
LAW OFFICES OF 
AMANN & WRAY, L.C. 
SUTTE 900 
NINE EXCHANGE PLACE 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
TELEPHONE: (801) 359-2230 
FACSIMILE: (801) 323-0822
 PAUL G. AMANN 
April 3, 1996 
VIA FACSIMILE 
John E. Schindler, Esq. 
First Interstate Bank Bldg. 
80 West Main, Suite 201 
Price, Utah 84501 
RE: Daley v. Daley 
Case No. 6189 
Dear Mr. Schindler: 
I am in receipt of the documents you have faxed regarding your 
Motion. I would like to again take this opportunity to give your 
client the opportunity to avoid incurring additional expenses by 
giving my client the value of the deductions which your client will 
garner by claiming my client and half the value of the deduction 
for their child. The amount, as stated previously is $1047. 
Otherwise, we will await Judge Halliday's ruling on the matter. 
Additionally, even assuming we can resolve the tax matter, it 
is likely that we will need a hearing on the Trans Am matter. My 
client, as has previously been stated to you, has no knowledge of 
its whereabouts. Therefore, I look forward to obtaining a date for 
hearing in this regard and wish to again advise you that I will 
bring the hearing for contempt at the same time—unless the couch 
reappears. 
Finally, in discussing this case with a fellow practitioner, 
it has been brought to my attention that I should bring to your 
attention, directly,, the potential conflict of interest involved in 
this case. We understand that you are one of three prosecutors in 
Carbon County. As part of the discovery in this matter we have 
learned that your client may currently be involved in activities 
violative of Utah law. Enclosed are the relevant sections of the 
Utah Code which my client can attest your client has violated 
and/or continues to violate, specifically pertaining to animal 
cruelty. Additionally, and more importantly, your pleadings 
suggest a violation of U.C.A. § 76-5-401. Lisa was born on 
November 27, 1973. Cory was born on June 27, 1990. The parties 
were married on July 24, 1990. Consequently, at the time of Cory's 
conception, (approximately September 15, 1989), Lisa was but 15 
years old and unmarried. Please accept this letter as notification 
to the prosecutor for purposes of triggering § 76-1-303(3) of a 
potential violation of § 76-5-401. 
£xJU4 J ^ ; ' APR 0 5 m 
John Schindler 
April 3, 1996 
Page 2 
Since this case was commenced, Lisa has consistently 
maintained her position that she should be awarded the sole, 
permanent care, custody and control of Cory. She also maintains 
that she is entitled to guideline support, spousal support, and an 
equitable distribution of the marital estate. From her 
perspective, in response to her legitimate claims, she has been 
subjected to having her hair tested for controlled substances, her 
personal and confidential medical records scrutinized, her being 
falsely accused of criminal conduct, etc. In divorce cases there 
likely will be some friction and significant issues that need to be 
resolved. I fear that this case has developed a somewhat unique 
and inappropriate tone, however. Lisa does not wish to further 
damage the relationship between herself and the father of her 
child. Nor does she wish to continue to dissipate the marital 
estate by incurring significant attorneys' fees. I do not wish to 
anger or alienate a fellow member of the bar, especially over what 
should be a fairly routine divorce matter. We certainly do not 
wish to prolong this matter and we therefore would like to maintain 
the current trial date so that this matter may finally be resolved, 
and will certainly appreciate the opportunity of working with you 
towards a conclusion. 
Thank you for your attention to these matters. 
Very truly yours, 
*aul G. Amann 
cc: client 
PGA/cns 
dom.a-e\daley\schi-S.ltr 
.. APil 0 3 1995 
EMERY COUNTY ATTORNEY 
PO Box 249 
Castle Dale, Utah 84513-0249 
DAVID A BLACKWELL, County Attorney 
MARY L. MANLEY, Deputy County Attorney 
April 18, 1996 
Paul G. Amann 
Amann & Wray, L C . 
Attorneys at Law 
Nine Exchange Place, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
John E. Schindler 
Attorney at Law 
First Interstate Bank Building 
80 West Main, Suite 201 
Price, Utah 84501 
Re: Daley v. Daley 
Case No. 6189 
Dear Counselors: 
This letter is intended to notify the involved parties that I recently received a copy of a 
correspondence from Paul G. Amann dated April 3, 1996, addressed to John E. Schindler, Esq. 
This correspondence was provided to me by John E. Schindler. It is my understanding that 
the correspondence was provided by Mr. Schindler in an effort to notify me of possible alleged 
criminal violations involving Danny Daley as per the request of the letter. 
Aside from this correspondence, I have received no other information from any of the parties 
involved, either informally or by referral from the appropriate law enforcement agency, 
regarding these matters. From the content of the letter, I wonder if there is not a mistaken 
belief that Mr. Schindler is a prosecutor in the same county in which Mr. Daley is alleged to 
have committed these offenses. I assume, without further information, that these offenses 
are alleged to have been committed in Emery County - both parties' residence. Mr. Schindler, 
of course, is a prosecutor in Carbon County. In any event, if it is desired that these matters 
be investigated further, a formal complaint should be filed by the interested parties wi th the 
appropriate law enforcement agency so that it may be forwarded to the appropriate 
prosecuting agency. 
Sincerely, 
Mafcy L. Twanley(^ / 
Deputy Emery County Attorney 
MLM/tm 
cdMlb 
Telephone (801) 381-2543 
FAX (801) 381-5644 
'
n
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EMERY COUNTY ATTORNEY 
P.O. Box 249 
Castle Dale. Utah 64513-0249 
DAVID A. BLACKWELL, County Attorney 
MARY L MANLEY, Deputy County Attorney 
ALLEN S. THORPE, Deputy County Attorney 
June 6, 1996 
Telephone (801) 381-2543 
FAX (801) 381-5844 
E-MAIL: bwe!!ef*1,co.emery.ut.us 
Paul G, Amann 
AMANN & WRAY 
Attorneys at Law 
Nine Exchange Place, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: Danny Daley 
Dear Mr, Amann: 
This is in response to your letter. I misspoke when I stated that I would be filing a formal 
denial of these charges. I had already filed one when I initially reviewed the case just 
shortly after it was filed. I suppose your tone and stance took me a little off guard as I do 
not encounter it often with other members of the Bar. As you are not an attorney of record 
in this case, and as I am sure you can appreciate, I have an obligation of privacy to those 
not charged. Therefore, you will not be receiving that denial, 
I will indicate to you, however, that I believe the statute of (imitations has run on this case. 
Ms. Daley made a complaint for Unlawful Sexual Intercourse; not Rape of a Child. She was 
clearly fifteen years of age at the time - not under fourteen - nor were there any facts 
presented to me in her statement regarding enticement or coercion. 
As a personal note, I think that at the time this offense occurred, it would have been 
appropriate for an Unlawful Sexual Intercourse charge. I am sure that Ms. Daley has had 
to pay an unfortunate price for some very poor decisions made on her behalf. Clearly, at 
fifteen she couldn't be expected to appreciate the high likelihood that her relationship with 
Mr. Daley would end up as it has. I assume her parents must have authorized her marriage 
to him, which may not have been the best choice for her. I suppose we all do the best we 
know how to do for our children and when we know better we do better. 
In any event, I did staff this case with my supervisor when it was originally presented and 
it was the consensus that this case not be charged. 
Sincerely, 
-o^W^i -rf^JW-
Mary L. Manley 
Deputy Emery County 
MLM/tm ULMlc 
EXHIBIT 2 - MEMORANDUM DECISION 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
EMERY COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH 
DANNY P. DALEY, 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : 
LISA D. DALEY, i 
Defendant. : 
: MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Civil No. 6189 
This matter was before the Court for trial on the divorce 
matter as well as on Orders to Show Cause by the parties seeking 
that the Court find the Plaintiff in contempt for failing to 
deliver personal property and/or pay support and alimony payments, 
and the Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause seeking contempt against 
the Defendant for failing to sign the tax return for 1995 and/or 
allowing Plaintiff the exemption of the minor, Cory Daley. 
Both parties seek a divorce herein and the Court concludes 
that there is evidence before the Court to find grounds for 
granting the divorce to each party and therefore a mutual divorce 
is ordered. 
With regard to custody of the minor child of the parties 
hereto the Court concludes that Cory is issue of this marriage, 
although born prior to the marriage of the parties herein, but 
during the time the parties cohabited. The Court concludes from 
the evidence that the Defendant herein is the primary care giver in 
2 
this marital relationship and specifically relies upon the fact 
that during the stormy periods of this marriage the Defendant was 
always the one who took the child and cared for the child during 
the various periods of separation from the Plaintiff herein. The 
Court would, based upon that evidence as well as the age of the 
child, place the custody in the mother and award reasonable 
visitation privileges to the father. However, under the 
circumstances and the testimony, the Court is concerned about the 
Defendant's drug use and believes that counseling and in-patient 
therapy should be part and parcel of the orders herein. I 
therefore conclude that at the present time it is best to award 
joint custody to these parties of the minor child, placing the 
physical custody of the child with the father herein, Danny Daley, 
subject to reasonable visitation privileges on the part of the 
mother. The Court requires as a condition for exercise of those 
reasonable visitation privileges, which at a minimum should reflect 
the minimum schedule set forth in the statutory framework for 
visitation, that the Defendant undertake and successfully complete 
drug and/or alcohol therapy on an in-patient basis if available and 
if same can be paid, or partially paid for, under the terms and 
provisions of the Plaintifffs medical insurance. In the event that 
all of the costs of that therapy cannot be paid for under the 
insurance then the remaining balance should be paid by the parties 
3 
on the same percentage basis as the Court allocates for purposes of 
child support hereafter referred to. Upon the successful 
completion of therapy by the Defendant the Court orders joint 
custody be implemented by the parties to assure maximum time with 
each of the parents considering the following circumstances. The 
father is, and has been, the providing parent and is presently tied 
up working and should continue to provide for the support of the 
child and/or the mother, since they are dependent on his efforts, 
but he should be allowed his fifty percent of the time on the basis 
of that working schedule to the extent possible. This does not 
require, however, the Defendant give up all weekend time with the 
child but will necessitate adjustments by the parties as best they 
can agree. The Court is cognizant that joint custody is generally 
not appropriate where the parties, as here is evident, have strong 
disagreements between each other, however, because of what the 
Court perceives to be the inability of either party to adequately 
and appropriately care for the child alone, the Court concludes 
that both of their best efforts will be needed to assure the 
child's continued development but I believe the best interest of 
the child requires this action under these circumstances. I am 
especially concerned that the surrogate parents or other family 
members will become substitute parents for this child if these 
parents do not learn to cooperate for the best interest of the 
child. 
4 
I believe it proper in this case to authorize and order that 
random drug scans of either party at the request of the other party 
be required, provided that the other party pays for the test. This 
provision to remain in force and effect even after Ms. Daley 
completes counseling required above. 
The general pre-dilection of the Court favoring the natural 
parents custody over substitute parents again weighs heavily in 
favor of the joint arrangement herein provided. 
This case is replete with incidents when one or the other 
parent uses the child to badger the other (e.g., the name-calling 
incidents referred to by the Evaluator and on the tape filed herein 
as Exhibit No. 23), or gain some perceived benefit or control over 
the other parent (such as failure to "timely" pay support and/or 
alimony; and refusal to "timely" furnish an "operable" motor 
vehicle). 
The Court's task has been made more difficult by what I 
perceive is the conscious effort by both parties to keep me in the 
dark. Never have I had so many unresolved issues of such minor 
significance, for instance: 
1. Where is the 1988 Pontiac Grand Am? Why report it 
stolen? Why report the car theft from Plaintiffs house and not 
from where it was taken? Did Plaintiff follow and retake 
possession? Who knows? Someone must know, why weren't they 
present to testify? 
5 
2. Where is the missing sectional of the couch? 
3. Where is the dagger? 
4. Where are the guns? 
The testimony indicates that both of these individuals have 
multiple ways or means of knowing what the other one is doing and 
has been doing. Why can Plaintiff remember minor details about 
issues favorable to his claims but only knows the borrowed 
$8,500.00 was spent on bills (unnamed and unspecified). Why is 
borrowing $8,500.00 necessary? Is it to restructure his Financial 
Statement? Why is a change from eight dependents to two necessary 
in the middle of a divorce? Except to restructure his Financial 
Statement. 
I conclude that both parties are less than forthright, 
immature, and constantly attempting to present themselves in the 
most favorable light while at the same time belittling the other, 
and both therefore lack credibility in the Court's eyes. 
The Court is nevertheless confident that the child has strong 
and meaningful attachments to both of the parties herein and I wish 
to encourage the continuation of those positive connections. Upon 
the Defendant's successful completion of an in-patient program or 
the equivalent of a thirty to sixty-day in-patient program, and 
upon her establishing her own individual place of residence, the 
Court, upon the request of either party, will order a hearing be 
held to establish whether the custody arrangements should be 
6 
modified. In the event that no successful completion is 
accomplished the original placement herein shall continue. The 
Court specifically reserves this question so that no change of 
circumstances need be shown on either side. 
The Court concludes that for purposes of child support the 
Plaintiff's base salary is $3,432.00, computed as follows: $19.30 
per hour times 40 hours per week times 4.3 weeks per month, and the 
same shall be the wage used for the Plaintiff in determining, under 
the Uniform Guidelines, the minimum support payments to be made 
and/or received. The Court further finds that the Defendant, but 
for the therapy and treatment which the Court concludes is 
necessary and was brought upon by the Defendant's own conduct, is 
employable and should be charged with earning a minimum wage and 
same should be attributed to her in determining the amount of 
child support payable by the parties herein. Worksheets to be 
provided accordingly. 
The Court concludes that this family situation justifies the 
Court not granting the divorce become final for six months from the 
date of this Memorandum Decision to allow the parties to complete 
and/or accomplish the requirements set forth herein and to continue 
the medical coverage for payment of the medical expenses incurred 
and/or to be incurred by the parties. 
7 
The Plaintiff :- ordered to keep in f*: ' force and effect all 
medical coverage I il ie I ei n J. 1111. 
reasonable cost through his employment until the divorce becomes 
final six months from -• - . In - event that there are unpaid 
medical expenses acci 
pay their proportionate share the same proportion as found m 
the Support Worksheets. Upon the divorce becoming final Plaintiff 
shall continue insurance iiiy. hi I l 
employer so long as same is available reasonable cost, 
event ^hn* Defendant becomes employed she should provide insurance 
(secondary) -.. *-.: .::... i. .ersel f- •-
at reasonable vosr ne parties to pa ali unpaid medica^, 
prescription, dentist, wo. ^ ike costs i.. .^..^  percentages as 
support payments. 
Plaintiff should be allowed to purchase from the Defendant the 
dependency allocation ' ' * "ax purposes, such 
computation i. * Iruil « "Mvi Mis as a 
single parent and ric *^ the oasis ui changed circumstances ii i the 
event that the Defendant remarries. 
1 1 i e ZQ\ i t ! • 3i i : 1 i ici'ii - •• ' ^roperty 
i n P l a i n t i f f ' s p r o p o s a l which P l a i n t n f c l a i m s were p r e - m a r i t a l 
g i f t s , t o - w i t : t h e lufl r i f l e , t h e Browning . . . r i f l e , -* : ; :...T.;.. 
si 10 t gun, Mi I i l ,„ M M Il >" l IN I ' l l Mia rqe r and u n d i i -~ % German 
dagger and s h e a t h , s h o u l d be awarded t o ttv,j P l a i n t i f i a s
 t 
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marital property separate and apart from the division hereafter 
referred to. The requested division as set forth in Plaintiff's 
proposal as hereafter modified, should be confirmed by the Court, 
but allowing the Defendant to select either list, and from the 
properties listed in the other (non-selected) list, at values set 
forth by Plaintiff, she may select any six items she chooses and 
substitute any six items from her list of equal value. The Court 
does this on the basis of Plaintiff's testimony that he would 
accept either one of the lists, provided that the properties were 
in the same condition as they were at the time of separation, 
normal wear and tear excepted. 
The Court is convinced by the evidence that the items listed 
in Plaintiff's list designated "Defendant's Personal Property1' 
including the Ruger 9mm handgun, the .12 gauge shotgun, the Ruger 
.264 magnum, the Ruger mini 14-223, and the Remington .22-250, 
disappeared as testified to by Plaintiff all at the same time, and 
since subsequently Plaintiff found one of the items in a pawn shop 
with the Defendant's signature on the pawn ticket, all said items 
should be attributed to the Defendant and should remain as charges 
at the value set forth in Plaintiff's proposal against Defendant 
unless "discovered" and returned and mutually divided by the 
parties. 
9 
The lists of personal property between which Defendant : s. -_w 
1 and are modified as follows: 
1. Property listen - Defendant s Summary :r Persona; 
Propex . ^  ^  
be added tc san *:s- -r values <•- .n Defendant s Summary, to-..-. 
FF, " "" " " ' *fi< ar<~ ^D also AA at $15"* 
v ai , 
HH (Court determines from evidence belongs iu Piainrj.fr and nave 
only nominal/sentimental '^ \e s^o^'d W ~e included - either 
l i s • 
belong to Plaintiff. 
2. Property listed :i n Defendant"' s list is modi fied by 
a ; : i -«--: ,,. * * 
proposed distribution, Exhibit N ir_i designated therein a^ j, 
T * H »^n^  "^ r,'}*- r../ . r actually delivered 
C ^ . ... 0 
shoui 1 go wit:, \::tr : -^ . property. Sa^a list should be reuuced oy 
the items belonging *• c^r*/ : sted in Defendant's Exhibit 
Those items ar • = y 
physical custodian's residence. 
3. ' As above indicated whichever list Defendant chooses 
i-' I,I I i i|i|ii"rprispf1 hi"," i h t - ill ii if "inns previously alluded to 
above. 
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4. The value of Plaintiff's list should be reduced by 
the Banshee ATV and Defendant's increased by same, 
5. The 1988 Pontiac valued at $3,000.00 shall be 
attributed to Defendant and shall come off any list awarded to 
Plaintiff if otherwise on same. 
Decree of Divorce shall contain provisions as requested by 
Defendant in paragraphs 21, 50, 51, 52, 53, and 55 of Defendant's 
Exhibit No. 21. 
The Court cannot conclude from the evidence who has the 
Pontiac Grand Am but the evidence is clear that Defendant 
surreptitiously took possession from Plaintiff. Since, from the 
evidence, it was last in her possession before its disappearance it 
is her burden to convince the Court of its present owner or 
whereabouts. Since Defendant has failed to convince this Court 
that Plaintiff has retaken possession the Court, finding it 
Defendant's burden to do so, attributes the $3,000.00 Pontiac Grand 
Am to the Defendant herein. 
Since the Plaintiff is, at this stage, the only real wage-
earner, the Court orders that the Plaintiff pay the debts as 
follows: Those debts listed under paragraph A, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 
and 8 of Plaintiff's proposal as well as those items listed under 
B, 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 of Plaintiff's proposal. To the 
extent that the doctor bills are not paid by Plaintiff's insurance 
and to the extent that they were incurred after the date 
separati' ' > : 
same- She ^na„ also pay d.; other individual debts incurred after 
the separation date. 
1 . , / 
greater value of personal property after the selection 
Defendant herein as above outlined, the Court orders that the 
Plain! i l l II, i t . in I  I i i i i i i I i I i il i ! I il i in in I I1 in i n II | 
obligations which he ultimately pays out-of-pocket
 r against the 
personal property list thereby reducing the value :r r. .s . :sr .'is-
a i 5 th = = .1 i ::iai i :i/ 
payments made for doctors and/or hospitalization Plaintiff's 
insurance carrier, After all the foregoing adjustments, the party 
rec e i ^  i :i: lg !:: I: I a. g r eatat. .; < • e 
o t h e r p a r t y o n e - h a l f :>; t h e d i f f e r e n c e i n v a l u e . 
The Court c o n c l u d e s t h a t t h e r e a l p r o p e r t y owned the 
K. i * L . r ^ e 
v a l u e d a t t r ie oi-.ii c. $53,50C ': c p a y o f f v a l u e -^ .^ : the 
da te of t h e hear ing h e r e i n was some $ 4 7 , 0 1 6 - 0 0 making a n , e q u i t a b l e 
v . i 1 u i MI *u l n I I mi in mi i t i l l l 11II w h i c h s h o u l d 1: e p a :ii I b] the 
P l a i n t i f f t o t : Defendant for thwi th , tlidL n i. VJ., -Mmi C I) n le Zciiii: t 
c o n c l u d e s t h e ';\0>K: : M ; jdi i" c la imed by P l a i n t i f f was n o t a loan 
,=ind 111 i I"I|'i I i "in estate. 
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The home is to be awarded to the Plaintiff subject to the 
obligations herein described and the Plaintiff shall have a lien 
against the home for the payment of all obligations herein 
outlined. 
The Court concludes that the Plaintiff borrowed $8,500.00 
which he claims to have applied toward debt but which he gave no 
clear accounting of any monies actually paid by the Plaintiff for 
the marital estate's benefit. The Court therefore orders one-half 
of the value of the amount withdrawn to be paid by the Plaintiff to 
the Defendant at the rate of $100.00 per month, no interest to be 
charged in the event that payments are made in a timely fashion on 
or before the 5th day of each month beginning with the month 
following this Memorandum Decision. 
The Court concludes that the Defendant is in need of 
assistance in providing for her support and further that the 
Plaintiff has the ability to pay and hereby orders that the 
Plaintiff pay to the Defendant the sum of $200.00 per month as and 
for alimony, the same to continue for a five year period equivalent 
to the time the parties were married, to-wit: from July 24,1990 to 
the date of separation, to-wit: July 28, 1995, or until the 
happening of an event which statutorily authorizes the termination 
of alimony occurs, whichever event first occurs. 
Plaintiff shall have as his own separate property, free from 
any claim by the Defendant thereon, any and all of his retirement 
13 
programs including any and al 1 withdrawals therefrom during the 
m a r t ] . n j ,, , I .M, J I n w i i in I m i i i n | I I n I l i in in i i in i I i i ITIPI I I 
'Defendant, but shall continue any life insurance < :>n his life as a 
benefit nf employment where the minor child is beneficiary until 
t 
Defendant shall be solely and separately liable for payment of 
the Colonial Bank Mastercard account and any and all debts incurred 
b . l ln I ie tiendiiii l H l i i I In epa i* i t i \ in In I ' ll'i n PM?ep t: med i ::a 1 
as above referred to. 
The Cour*~ oelieves from, the testimony that neither or rne 
pa^ ;_*••?- . >r till i! :i gh t ; i :ii t i l t h • = .• • 2 : n :i r t a i v I • :):i : • * 
The evidence leads the Court to conclude that the Plaintiff has 
used every effort to disguise monies and assets which he has had 
a v'aila b J I • i-i L :::  ! hi i ill i i € .b t s : -r r * — -
obligations and not as money taken for persona-. ^^^ ^^ ^^ 
benefit. The Court believes some ol the testimony would indicate 
t * ' 
that such is L..er Jd^ -.j Based upcu i..^  .naLx^t:, _w
 M^i^~ landings 
relative tj the exa," amounts of credits and/or debts, the Court 
ir * * * * - : a - obligations 
parties, alimony and/or suppor t whic 1 i I I DeIieve I n i 3 ] tairnea:= 
addresses both parties claims fairly. The Court has reduced the 
1 • - i ' ivard because jf the la rge 
indebtedness .: ...^  parties . . - - n t: i :i la t I: !: ie leb t: s • .] • 
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satisfied other than by the payment thereof by Plaintiff 
(bankruptcy, etc.) I reserve the right to re-visit the amount of 
alimony awarded. 
As is obvious to the parties herein, the Court had originally 
planned on relying upon recommendations of Dr. Burgess and her 
custody/home evaluations. However, both parties chose to eliminate 
her continued involvement and the Court has been disadvantaged 
thereby. I note that no provision has been made for payment of the 
fees incurred in the evaluation other than the Court's initial 
order. The Court, because of the Defendant's inability to pay at 
this time and the need for making a speedy and just provision for 
payment of the entire obligation incurred, the same having been 
"ordered" by the Court, now orders the Plaintiff herein to pay any 
balance thereon. 
It is clear that Defendant is in need of assistance for 
payment of attorney fees herein also. The Court is concerned that 
the total value of attorney fees accumulated in this matter, 
because of what appears to the Court to be the less than forthright 
conduct of the parties, is considerably greater than the normal 
fees for such a divorce. Based upon the Court's overall decision 
herein the Court concludes that the Plaintiff should pay to the 
Defendant for the benefit of her attorney $5,000.00 of the claimed 
attorney fees up to and including the date of trial, and Defendant 
should pay the balance including all costs, etc., incurred 
subsequent I I i i ni II . 
Plaintiff's attorney is directed to prepare Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, anc Decree n: Divorce and submit same for 
appi"'! i mi I I „i| |; 1 1 r 
signature. 
DATED this ^ 2 L day of
 XSJ&< <&tM± , 1997, 
''BRUCE K. HALLIDAY 
District Court 
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EXHIBIT 3 - FINDINGS OF FACT 
JOHN E. SCHINDLER, #3 619 
Attorney for Plaintiff, 
8 0 West Main, Suite 2 01 
Price, Utah 84501 
Telephone (801) 637-1783 
^o 
SEVENTH DISTRICT 
COURT/EMERY 
- ' 
in i MI 1,111111 n u n i !>,i m vn i r c o m i i 
EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DANN\ 
Vs. 
LISA „. 
DALEY, 
Plaintiff, 
DALEY, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 6189 
Honorable Bruce K. Hall. 
T h i s n i i i I I i" i, 11 in I I 6 ; 
May 24, 1996; August 23, 1996, and October Honoraole 
Bruce K. Halliday presiding. The Plaintiff was personally present 
The Defendant was 
personally present with «. ~ counsel record, Michael 7-rav. 
The Court received testimony and exhibits and having reviewed and 
informed and having 
issued a Memorandum Decision now makes and enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
I Il" I II | hi r ties seek: a divorce herein and the Court concludes 
that 'there IL. evidence before the Cour 
granting the divorce to each party and therefore a mutual divorce 
With regard to custody ut Uie m m n ", I I I > pdit.uji. 
hereto Court concludes that Cory .^  issue marriage, 
in in | ii i i l M l n niiirr i aqe ui une parties herein, but 
during the time the parties cohabited. The Court concludes from 
the evidence that the Defendant herein is the primary care giver in 
this marital relationship and specifically relies upon the fact 
that during the stormy periods of this marriage the Defendant was 
always the one who took the child and cared for the child during 
the various periods of separation from the Plaintiff herein. 
The Court would, based upon that evidence as well as the age 
of the child, place the custody in the mother and award reasonable 
visitation privileges to the father. However, under the 
circumstances and the testimony, the Court is concerned about the 
Defendant's drug use and believes that counseling and in-patient 
therapy should be part and parcel of the orders herein. 
I therefore conclude that at the present time it is best to 
award joint custody to these parties of the minor child, placing 
the physical custody of the child with the father herein, Danny 
Daley, subject to reasonable visitation privileges on the part of 
the mother. 
The Court requires as a condition for exercise of those 
reasonable visitation privileges, which at a minimum should reflect 
the minimum schedule set forth in the statutory framework for 
visitation, that the Defendant undertake and successfully complete 
drug and/or alcohol therapy on an in-patient basis if available and 
if same can be paid, or partially paid for, under the terms and 
provisions of the Plaintiff's medical insurance. In the event that 
- 2 -
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a i l 11 in ii. i n L ' C I L I ! J 111 i 11 i i ! i i f i a p y i IIIIIIIIIIIIII i m 11 m 11 m i 11 m i n n mi i i l i n e 
insurance then the remaining balance should be paid by the parties 
on the same percentage basis as the Court allocates for purposes of 
child suppor " i rati I .. 
completion therapy by the Defendant the Court orders int 
custody be implemented by the parties to assure maximum time with 
each • :: f the parents consider i IMJ I In*. I Il I  « 11 i n | i, i, n iioi'stanei, « The 
father is, and has been, the providing parent and is presently tied 
up working and should continue to provide for the support of the 
child and/or the mother, since they dependen ^ 
but he should be allowed his fifty percent of the time on the basis 
c • i i M, i-iri | schedule i" the extent possible Th 1 ^  does not 
require, however, the Defendant give ., ,ill weekend " . ' ^ 
child necessitate adjustments by the parties as best they 
c 
The Court is cognizant that joint custody genera. z 
appropriate where the parties, as here evident, have strong 
disagreemeT between each other, however, because of what the 
Court perceives to be the inability , .uner part adequately 
and appropriately care for the child alone, the Court concludes 
t afforts will be needed assure the 
child's continued development but relieve the best f 
the child requires this action under these circumstances. am 
especial!', concerned that the surrogate parents ^ other family 
members wiJI 1, become subst i I nil |Jd,u»111s I in i n i mil i i i iiuse 
parents do not learn to cooperate for the best interest of the 
child. 
3. I believe it proper in this case to authorize and order 
that random drug scans of either party at the request of the other 
party be required, provided that the other party pays for the test. 
This provision to remain in force and effect even after Ms. Daley 
completes counseling required above. 
4. The general pre-dilection of the Court favoring the 
natural parents custody over substitute parents again weighs 
heavily in favor of the joint arrangement herein provided. 
5. This case is replete with incidents when one or the other 
parent uses the child to badger the other (e.g., the name-calling 
incidents referred to by the Evaluator and on the tape filed herein 
as Exhibit No. 23), or gain some perceived benefit or control over 
the other parent (such as failure to "timely" pay support and/or 
alimony; and refusal to "timely" furnish an "operable" motor 
vehicle). 
6. The Court's task has been made more difficult by what I 
perceive is the conscious effort by both parties to keep me in the 
dark. Never have I had so many unresolved issues of such minor 
significance, for instance: 
A. Where is the 1988 Pontiac Grand Am? Why report it 
stolen? Why report the car theft from Plaintifffs house and not 
from where it was taken? Did Plaintiff follow and retake 
- 4 -
p o s s e s s i o n " njwbi ,I>M<JIJ,I IN I I I I I I 
p r e s e n t t o t e s t i f y ? 
B. • Where • * h i s s i n g s e c t i o n a l of t h e couch? 
C. where 
D. • Where are the guns? 
testimony indicates that both of these individuals have 
multiple ways or means nl I' in JW I IKJ wlnl I In Iliidi mil' i il  m IIII | 1111 II 
has been doing. Why can Plaintiff remember minor details about 
issues favorable • -1"* iwn ^^ ^ knows the borrowed 
$ 8 , 5 0 0 . 0 0 „ „ . s p e n t i f iHI 1  |i I J 1 :i;; , iii , 
borrowing $8,500.00 necessary? Is it to restructure his Financial 
Statement? Why is a change from eight dependents to two necessary 
the middle of a divorce ? Excep t t :: • i : 2. 5 t r i ic t: 1 1:1 : =1 h i 5 11? :i 1 lax n :: i a Il 
Statement. 
I ::: • ::: 1 1, :: Jl " 1  :i =1 the t I : : • th p a r t i e s •- ^ ^ *-^p fo r th r igh t , 
immature, and cons tant ly attempting present, uiemsei 
most favorable l i g h t while a t -.*.*•* :i ; i- b e l i t t l i n g the other, 
in in in in ii'iipnpf i rp iric'ii c r e d i b i l * •• " " i ^ ^ ' s e y e s * 
The C o u r t i s n e v e r t h e l e s s c o n n a e m . 
s t r o n g and mean ingfu l a t t a c h m e n t s t o bo th ;. t h e p a r t i e s h e r e i n and 
ncourage t h e c o n t i n u a t i o n • t h o s e p o s i t i v e c o n n e c t i o n s . 
Upon D e f e n d a n t ' s s u c c e s s f u l compj.e-
t h e e q u i v a l e n t of a t h i r t y t o s i x t y - d a y i n - p a t i e n t p r o g r a m , and 
upon h e r e s t a b l i s h i n g i n d i v i d u a l p l a c e r e s i d e n c e , t h e 
Court: ,„ upoi 1  tl le r e q u e s - :i : pai : !::;; • 1 i ] Il 
held to establish whether the custody arrangements should be 
modified. In the event that no successful completion is 
accomplished the original placement herein shall continue. The 
Court specifically reserves this question so that no change of 
circumstances need be shown on either side. 
8. The Court concludes that for purposes of child support the 
Plaintiff's base salary is $3,432.00, computed as follows: $19.80 
per hour times 40 hours per week times 4.3 weeks per month, and the 
same shall be the wage used for the Plaintiff in determining, under 
the Uniform Guidelines, the minimum support payments to be made 
and/or received. The Court further finds that the Defendant, but 
for the therapy and treatment which the Court concludes is 
necessary and was brought upon by the Defendant's own conduct, is 
employable and should be charged with earning a minimum wage and 
same should be attributed to her in determining the amount of 
child support payable by the parties herein. Worksheets to be 
provided accordingly. 
9. The Court concludes that this family situation justifies 
the Court not granting the divorce become final for six months from 
the date of the Memorandum Decision to allow the parties to 
complete and/or accomplish the requirements set forth herein and to 
continue the medical coverage for payment of the medical expenses 
incurred and/or to be incurred by the parties. 
- 6 -
10 . II •  I'l.i in e f f e c t 
a l l m e d i c a l c o v e r a g e . Defendant and u i e c h i l d a v a i l a b l e a t 
r e a s o n a b l e c o s t t h r o u g h h i s employment u n t i l t h e d i v o r c e becomes 
1 j , 11 Li I . " i i i '" 11 I i d 
medical expenses accrued hereunder Plaintiff anci Defendant shall 
pay their proportionate share in the same proportion *.- found in 
the Suppor t 1 :: rksheeL iff 
shall continue insurance coverage r„: child with his 
employer «=« 1 rTicj as same is available at reasonable cost the 
event that Jefendai :t t: becomes smplo} a I si I = 3h :: ;" :i ] I nee 
(secondary) on the child and herself as long as same is available 
at reasonable cost. "he parties ^I: unpaid medical, 
prescription, dentist, s 
support payments. 
1] Plaintiff should be allowed to purchase from the 
Defendant the dependency , 
such computation to be made the basis of Defendant's status as 
a single parent and on the basis of changed circumstances in 
the event M^.. uetendan t 
12. The Court concludes that the items listed as personal 
property in Plaintiff's proposal which Plaintiff claims were pre-
i ire-marital 
property separate and apart from the division hereafter referred 
to, to-wit: 
1. .308 rifle, 
2. Browning .22 rifle; 
3. .410 pump shotgun; 
4. desk; 
5. 1973 Dodge Charger; 
6. German dagger and sheath. 
The requested division as set forth in Plaintiff's proposal as 
hereafter modified, should be confirmed by the Court, but allowing 
the Defendant to select either list, and from the properties listed 
in the other (non-selected) list, at values set forth by Plaintiff, 
she may select any six items she chooses and substitute any six 
items from her list of equal value. The Court does this on the 
basis of Plaintiff's testimon chat he would accept either one of 
the lists, provided that the p Gerties were in the same condition 
as they were at the time of separation, normal wear and tear 
excepted. 
13. The Court is convinced by the evidence that the items 
listed in Plaintifffs list designated "Defendant's Personal 
Property" including the Ruger 9mm handgun, the .12 gauge shotgun, 
the Ruger .264 magnum, the Ruger mini 14-223, and the Remington 
.22-250, disappeared as testified to by Plaintiff all at the same 
time, and since subsequently Plaintiff found one of the items in a 
pawn shop with the Defendant's signature on the pawn ticket, all 
said items should be attributed to the Defendant and should remain 
as charges at the value set forth in Plaintiff's proposal against 
Defendant unless "discovered" and returned and mutually divided by 
the parties. 
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14. The lists of personal property between which Defendant is 
to choose begins with the lists presented by Plaintiff in Exhibit 
No. 1. 
a. The following is list No. 1 and should be awarded to 
Plaintiff unless otherwise designated by Defendant except as may be 
substituted by Defendant as above indicated: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
30. 
31. 
2 Dressers 
1 queen size bed 
1 kitchen table and 
Washer and dryer 
55 gallon fish tank 
3 end tables 
four chairs 
Old dishes and flatware 
Black couch and love seat 
TV 
Ruger .22 semi-auto 
SKS Rifle (1) 
Breadmaker (gift) 
Five man tent 
Weight bench 
Plants (6) 
Bicycle 
Colt 380 
rifle 
Ruger Semi auto pistol 
50 cassette tapes @ 
CD's 30 § $10.00 ea 
Clock radio 
Blender 
Tool boxes 
Miscellaneous tools 
Blankets (4) 
Vacuum 
Utility trailer 
Chevy truck 
ATV 
$8.00 ea 
1973 Dodge Challenger 
Bicycle 
TOTAL 
$ 300.00 
400.00 
200.00 
150.00 
100.00 
70.00 
70.00 
300.00 
150.00 
180.00 
100.00 
100.00 
150.00 
40.00 
150.00 
250.00 
200.00 
400.00 
300.00 
15.00 
15.00 
25.00 
150.00 
60.00 
300.00 
1,000.00 
2,500.00 
2,500.00 
150.00 
$10,325.00 
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Property listed in Defendant's Summary of Personal Property 
but not listed in Plaintiff's list (1. To Plaintiff) shall be added 
to list No. 1 at values set in Defendant's Summary, to-wit: 
EE. l chicken incubator $ 850 
GG. 2 red/blue mine lights + 2 base chargers 250 
II. 1 silver and gold wedding ring 150 
JJ. 1 almond Whirlpool refrigerator 80 
KK. l Sharp stereo with 2 large speakers 275 
LL. 1 black file cabinet 75 
MM. l stand for fish tank 125 
NN. 2 sand dune paddlewheel tires 180 
00. 2 men's 4 wheeler racing gloves 40 
PP. 1 AT&T telephone & answering machine 75 
AA. Misc. gun ammunition 150 
DD. Chickens 500 
TOTAL $2750.00 
GRAND TOTAL LIST NO. 1 $13,075.00 
b. The following property is not marital property, to-wit: 
BB. Jumper cables 
FF. 1 14x70 Nashua 
w/chicken pens, etc 
c. The following property belongs to Plaintiff and has only 
nominal/sentimental value, to-wit: 
HH. Misc. coins, silver bar 1,000 
d. The items listed above in sub paragraph b and c should not 
be included in either list, except as hereafter provided, but if 
they exist they should belong to Plaintiff. 
e. Property listed in Defendant's list is modified by adding 
at Defendant's estimated values those items reviewed in her 
proposed distribution, Exhibit No. 21, and designated therein as 
S. 12 diamond wedding ring 1,000.00 
T. 4 burial plots 355.00 
U. 1 blue area rug 30.00 
- 10 -
£37^ 
w. 
X. 
Y. 
Z. 
AA. 
BB. 
CC. 
1 baby book 
$800 cash taken from car 
by Plaintiff 
1 Black Hills gold anniversary ring 
1 Pioneer home stereo (in La Verkin) 
1 sand dune paddlewheel tires 
2 women's 4 wheeler racing gloves 
Clothing and personal effects 
20. 
800. 
100. 
700. 
180. 
40. 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
TOTAL $3225.00 
but only if actually delivered to Defendant, otherwise the items 
are deleted. Said list should be reduced by the items belonging to 
Cory listed in Defendant's Exhibit No. 21. Those items are awarded 
to Cory and go with him to the primary physical custodian's 
residence. 
f. The following is list No. 2 and should be awarded to 
Defendant unless otherwise designated by Defendant except as may be 
substituted by Defendant as above indicated. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
Red plastic gas can 
Large older radio and 
phonograph in wood cabinet 
Tools - socket set 3/8-drive 
Wrenches - screwdrivers 
Large box of children's books (new) 
Black metal rocking chair 
Power drill 
Space heater, bathroom scales (20 
5.00 
50.00 
60.00 
35.00 
100.00 
30.00 
80.00 
All records, titles, deeds, tax papers 
receipts, etc. 
Electric jeep (1) Three wheeler (1) 
Blue sectional couch 
Large home stereo in wood cabinet 
Tan filing cabinet 
Four or five blankets 
Two handmade quilts 
25 gallon fish tank 
Cassette tapes (100 at $8.00 ea) 
New Eureka vacuum 
15-20 video movies 
New cassette player 
Phone 
360.00 
1,200.00 
400.00 
40.00 
75.00 
100.00 
800.00 
100.00 
150.00 
15.00 
40.00 
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22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
30. 
31. 
32. 
33. 
34. 
35. 
36. 
37. 
38. 
39. 
40. 
41. 
42. 
43. 
44. 
45. 
46. 
47. 
48. 
49. 
50. 
51. 
52. 
53. 
54. 
55. 
56. 
57. 
58. 
59. 
60. 
61. 
62.. 
Clock radio 
New dishes 
Green clean machine 
(carpet cleaner) 
Family pictures 
Nice glasses 
Glass bowls 
New Smith-Corona 
Electronic typewriter 
New silverware in wood box 
Motorcycle helmet 
Bushnell Binoculars 
Minolta Camera 
Hitachi Camcorder 
Clothes hamper 
Cordless phone 
Battery charger 
Bicycle 
Answering machine 
Flashlights (2) 
Wall decorations 
Cherry wood jewelry box 
Captiva Camera 
Christmas decorations 
Ruger 989 9mm hand gun 
12 gauge shot gun 
Ruger 264 Magnum 
Ruger Mini 14-223 
Remington 22-250 
RCA VCR 
Oak coffee table 
Towels - sheets, etc. 
Plants and plant stands 
(brass and glass) 
Lamps 
End tables 
Kitchen table - four chairs 
Microwave 
Two dressers 
Compact discs (120 @ $10.00 ea) 
Cannon 35 mm camera 
2 lenses and case 
Miscellaneous gun ammo 
Jumper cables 
1988 Pontiac Grand Am 
Banshee ATV 
TOTAL 
GRAND TOTAL LIST NO. 2 
15.00 
50.00 
110.00 
40.00 
40.00 
300.00 
300.00 
150.00 
50.00 
130.00 
650.00 
5.00 
40.00 
30.00 
150.00 
30.00 
15.00 
200.00 
130.00 
130.00 
60.00 
400.00 
350.00 
600.00 
600.00 
500.00 
350.00 
100.00 
200.00 
300.00 
40.00 
80.00 
250.00 
150.00 
300.00 
1,200.00 
400.00 
150.00 
15.00 
3,000.00 
2,500.00 
$17,750.00 
$20,975.00 
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g. The water share listed as Item V should go with real 
property. 
h. As above indicated whichever list Defendant chooses is to 
be increased by the value of guns previously alluded to above. 
i. The value of Plaintiff's list should be reduced by the 
Banshee ATV and Defendant's increased by same. 
j . The Court cannot conclude from the evidence who has the 
Pontiac Grand Am but the evidence is clear that Defendant 
surreptitiously took possession from Plaintiff. Since, from the 
evidence, it was last in her possession before its disappearance it 
is her burden to convince the Court of its present owner or 
whereabouts. Since Defendant has failed to convince this Court 
that Plaintiff has retaken possession, the Court, finding it 
Defendant's burden to do so, awards the $3,000.00 Pontiac Grand Am 
to the Defendant herein. 
The 1988 Pontiac valued at $3,000.00 shall remain on 
Defendant's list and shall come off any list awarded to Plaintiff 
if otherwise on same. 
k. These items are awarded to Cory and go with him to the 
primary custodian's residence, to wit: 
1. 1 Dresser 
2. Single Mattress 
3. Sega and Games 
4. Baby car seat 
5. 2 baseball bats 
6., 2 Softball mitts 
7. 1 twin bed 
8. 1 baby swing 
9. 1 baby stroller 
10. Large box of children's books 
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11. 1 Crib (sold in 1992) 
12. Cory's full size bed 
15. Decree of Divorce shall contain provisions as requested 
by Defendant in paragraphs 21, 50, 51, 52, 53, and 55 of 
Defendant's Exhibit No. 21 as follows: 
a.(21) The Defendant should make arrangements to receive 
the child at the time he is to be returned and the Plaintiff should 
cooperate in this regard. 
b.(50) Name Change: The Defendant should have her maiden 
name of Olsen restored to her. 
c. (51) Inheritance: All property and all property rights 
which may be vested in either party as a result of family 
inheritance, trusts, or similar sources should be awarded to the 
party from whose family it came. 
d. (52) Documents: Each party should be ordered to execute 
and deliver to the other such documents as are required to 
implement the provisions of the Decree of Divorce entered by the 
Court. 
e. (53) Default: In the event either party to this action 
defaults in any obligations imposed by the Decree which is entered 
by the Court, the party in default shall be liable to the other 
party for all reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees and 
costs, incurred in the enforcement of the obligations created by 
the Decree. 
f. (55) The parties shall be permanently restrained and 
enjoined from bothering, harassing, annoying, threatening, or 
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harming the other parent or the minor child at their place of 
residence, employment, school, or any other place. 
16. Since the Plaintiff is, at this stage, the only real 
wage-earner the Court orders that the Plaintiff pay the debts as 
follows: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
Zions Bank Mastercard 
Zions Bank Visa 
Zions BAnk (Lumina) 
ORS 
Greentree Acceptance 
Desert View Credit Union 
(Grand Am Repair) 
Desert View Credit Union 
(Chevy Pickup) 
Discover Card 
Dr. Wayne Brown 
Dr. Jeffery Palen 
Southeastern Radiology 
Leo Hardy 
Utah Valley Medical Center 
Castle View Hospital 
Accounts Receivable Management 
Any debt incurred after separation 
$2,237 
1,100 
9,000 
700 
7,000 
3,200 
on July 28, 1995. 
TOTAL $23,237 
17. Defendant should assume and pay the following debts: 
A. Colonial Bank Mastercard 3,950; 
B. Castleview Hospital 
C. Any debt incurred after separation on July 28, 1995. 
18. To the extent that the doctor bills are not paid by 
Plaintiff's insurance and to the extent that they were incurred 
after the date of separation, to-wit: July 29, 1995, the Defendant 
is ordered to pay same. 
19. Defendant shall also pay all other individual debts 
incurred after the separation date. 
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20. To the extent that the Plaintiff receives a substantially 
greater value of personal property after the selection by the 
Defendant herein as above outlined, the Court orders that the 
Plaintiff be allowed a credit of one-half the value of all of the 
obligations which he ultimately pays out-of-pocketr against the 
personal property list, thereby reducing the value of his list vis-
a-vis the Defendant's list. This does not include insurance 
payments made for doctors and/or hospitalization by Plaintiff's 
insurance carrier. 
21. After all the foregoing adjustments, the party receiving 
the greatest value of personal property shall pay to the other 
party one-half of the difference in value. 
22. The Court concludes that the real property owned by the 
parties, as stipulated in open court by the parties, is to be 
valued at the sum of $53,500.00, that the payoff value as of the 
date of the hearing herein was some $47,016.00 making an equitable 
value of $6,484.00, one-half of which should be paid by the 
Plaintiff to the Defendant forthwith, that is $3,240.00. The Court 
concludes the $3,000.00 "loan" claimed by Plaintiff was not a loan 
and no obligation of the marital estate. 
23. The home including the water share is to be awarded to 
the Plaintiff subject to the obligations herein described and the 
Plaintiff shall have a lien against the home for the payment of all 
obligations herein outlined. 
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24. The Court concludes that the Plaintiff borrowed $8,500.00 
which he claims to have applied toward debt but which he gave no 
clear accounting of any monies actually paid by the Plaintiff for 
the marital estate's benefit. The Court therefore orders one-half 
of the value of the amount withdrawn to be paid by the Plaintiff to 
the Defendant at the rate of $100.00 per month, no interest to be 
charged in the event that payments are made in a timely fashion on 
or before the 5th day of each month beginning with the month 
following this Memorandum Decision. 
25. The Court concludes that the Defendant is in need of 
assistance in providing for her support and further that the 
Plaintiff has the ability to pay and hereby orders that the 
Plaintiff pay to the Defendant the sum of $200.00 per month as and 
for alimony, the same to continue for a five year period equivalent 
to the time the parties were married, to-wit: from July 24,1990 to 
the date of separation, to-wit: July 28, 1995, or until the 
happening of an event which statutorily authorizes the termination 
of alimony occurs, whichever event first occurs. 
26. Plaintiff shall have as his own separate property, free 
from any claim by the Defendant thereon, any and all of his 
retirement programs, including any and all withdrawals therefrom 
during the marriage and specifically including the $14,000.00 
claimed by Defendant, but shall continue any life insurance on his 
life as a benefit of employment where the minor child is 
beneficiary until the minor reaches his majority. 
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27. Defendant shall be solely and separately liable for 
payment of the Colonial Bank Mastercard account and any and all 
debts incurred by the Defendant after the separation July 28, 1995 
except medical as above referred to. 
28. The Court believes from the testimony that neither of the 
parties have been forthright with the Court and/or with each other. 
The evidence leads the Court to conclude that the Plaintiff has 
used every effort to disguise monies and assets which he has had 
available to him as debts and/or necessary payments on marital 
obligations and not as money taken for his own personal use and/or 
benefit. The Court believes some of the testimony would indicate 
the contrary but cannot find by a preponderance of the evidence 
that such is the case. Based upon the inability to make findings 
relative to the exact amounts of credits and/or debts, the Court 
made adjustments with regard to the claimed obligations of the 
parties, alimony and/or support which I believe in all fairness 
addresses both parties claims fairly. The Court has reduced the 
level of alimony that I would normally award because of the large 
indebtedness of the parties. In the event that the debts are 
satisfied other than by the payment thereof by Plaintiff 
(bankruptcy, etc.) I reserve the right to re-visit the amount of 
alimony awarded. 
29. As is obvious to the parties herein, the Court had 
originally planned on relying upon recommendations of Dr. Burgess 
and her custody/home evaluations. However, both parties chose to 
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eliminate her continued involvement and the Court has been 
disadvantaged thereby. I note that no provision has been made for 
payment of the fees incurred in the evaluation other than the 
Court's initial order. The Court, because of the Defendant's 
inability to pay at this time and the need for making a speedy and 
just provision for payment of the entire obligation incurred, the 
same having been "ordered" by the Court, now orders the Plaintiff 
herein to pay any balance thereon. 
30. It is clear that Defendant is in need of assistance for 
payment of attorney fees herein also. The Court is concerned that 
the total value of attorney fees accumulated in this matter, 
because of what appears to the Court to be the less than forthright 
conduct of the parties, is considerably greater than the normal 
fees for such a divorce. Based upon the Court1s overall decision 
herein, the Court concludes that the Plaintiff should pay to the 
Defendant for the benefit of her attorney $5,000.00 of the claimed 
attorney fees up to and including the date of trial, and Defendant 
should pay the balance including all costsf etc., incurred 
subsequent to trial. 
Having made and entered the above Findings of Pact, the Court 
now makes the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court has jurisdiction over the parties hereto and the 
subject matter hereof. 
- 19 -
03%^ 
2. The Court's Findings are reasonable and should be adopted 
as the order of this Court. 
DATED this^l£p3ay of vSTZ^^Z^-H , 1997. 
District Court Judgev 
Daley\Findings\sm 
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EXHIBIT 4-DECREE 
ID 
JOHN E. SCHINDLER, #3 619 
Attorney for Plaintiff, 
80 West Main, Suite 201 
Price, Utah 84501 
Telephone (801) 637-1783 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DANNY P. DALEY, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
V s . 
LISA D. DALEY, 
Defendant . 
i DECREE OF DIVORCE 
C i v i l No. 6189 
Honorable Bruce K. H a l l i d a y 
This matter came before the Court for trial on May 2, 1996; 
May 24, 1996; August 23, 1996, and October 1, 1996, the Honorable 
Bruce K. Halliday presiding. The Plaintiff was personally present 
with his counsel of record, John E. Schindler. The Defendant was 
personally present with her counsel of record, Michael H. Wray. 
The Court received testimony and exhibits and having reviewed and 
considered same and being otherwise fully informed and having 
issued a Memorandum Decision and made and entered Findings of Facts 
and Conclusions of Law, 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Divorce: Each party is awarded to a Decree of Divorce, 
one from the other. The divorce shall not be final until July 
20,1997. All other terms and conditions of the Decree shall become 
effective upon entry by the Clerk in the Registry of Actions which 
shall occur immediately. 
2. Custody/Visitation; Plaintiff and Defendant are hereby 
> 
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awarded the joint custody of their minor child, Cory. Plaintiff is 
awarded the primary physical custody of Cory subject to reasonable 
visitation by the Defendant which, at a minimum, is the minimum 
schedule set forth in the statutory framework upon the condition 
that the Defendant undertake and successfully complete a thirty 
(30) to sixty (60) day drug and/or alcohol program on an in-patient 
basis. 
Joint custody as ordered herein shall continue until further 
order of the court. 
3. Subsequent Custody Qrder; The order of joint custody 
hereby implemented may be revisited on motion of either party after 
Defendant completes in-patient drug/alcohol counseling as above 
required without a showing of a substantial change of material 
circumstances. 
4. Defendants Drug Treatment: As a condition to Defendant's 
visitation of the child, Defendant will enter into and successfully 
complete a thirty (30) to sixty (60) day in-patient drug/alcohol 
program which will be paid for by the insurance coverage provided 
by Plaintiff's insurance through his employment. Those amounts not 
paid by this coverage will be paid eighty one (81%) percent by 
Plaintiff and nineteen (19%) percent by Defendant. 
5. Random Drag Scans; Either party shall, at the request of 
the other, and provided that party pays for the test, submit to 
random drug scans. 
6. Child Support: Defendant shall pay to the Plaintiff the 
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sum of $92.00 as and for child support. Said amount shall be due 
beginning February 1, 1997 and be payable one-half on or before the 
5ch and one-half on or before the 20ch day of each month. 
7. Medical Coverage: Plaintiff shall continue in full force 
and effect all medical coverage available for the child. Plaintiff 
shall continue in full force and effect all medical coverage 
available for Defendant until July 20, 1997. 
In the event there are unpaid medical expenses incurred for 
and on behalf of the minor child, Plaintiff shall pay 81% thereof 
and Defendant shall pay 19%. 
In the event the Defendant becomes employed, she shall provide 
secondary medical coverage for the child and herself so long as it 
is available at reasonable cost. 
Unpaid medical, prescription, dental and other medical costs 
for the child shall be paid eighty one (81%) percent by the 
Plaintiff and nineteen (19%) percent by the Defendant. 
8. Tax Dependants: Plaintiff shall be allowed to purchase 
from the Defendant the dependancy allowance of the child for tax 
purposes. The calculation of the amount to be paid by the 
Plaintiff to the Defendant to secure the child as a dependant for 
tax purposes shall be determined by utilizing the Defendant's 
status as a single parent not on the basis of changed circumstances 
in the event she remarries. 
9. Personal Property: Pre-marital or non-marital - Plaintiff: 
A. The Plaintiff is hereby awarded the following 
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property as premarital property free and clear of any claim of the 
Defendant: 
1. .308 rifle; 
2. Browning .22 rifle; 
3. .410 pump shotgun; 
4. desk; 
5. 1973 Dodge Charger; 
6. German dagger and sheath. 
B. The following items of personal property are either 
not marital property or pre-marital property or property having 
only nominal or sentimental value. Plaintiff is hereby awarded any 
interest that the parties may have in and to these items: 
BB. Jumper Cables 
CC. 1973 Dodge Charger 
FF. 14x70 Nashua with chicken pens, etc. 
HH. Miscellaneous coins, silver bar 
10. Personal Property: The following are two lists of 
personal property: 
A. The following is list No. 1 and should be awarded to 
Plaintiff unless otherwise designated -by Defendant except as may be 
substituted by Defendant as indicated herein: 
1. 1 Dresser (1 dresser to Cory) 
2. 1 queen size bed 
3. 1 kitchen table and four chairs 
4. Washer and dryer 
5. 55 gallon fish tank 
6. 3 end tables 
7. Old dishes and flatware 
8. Black couch and love seat 
9. TV 
10. Ruger .22 semi-auto rifle 
11. SKS Rifle (1) 
12,. Bread maker 
13. Five man tent 
14. Weight bench 
15. Plants (6) 
16. Bicycle 
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17. Colt 380 
18. Ruger Serai auto pistol 
19. 50 cassette tapes @ $8.00 ea 
20. CD's 30 § $10.00 ea 
21. Clock radio 
22. Blender 
23. Tool boxes 
24. Miscellaneous tools 
25. Blankets (4) 
26. Vacuum 
27. Utility trailer 
28. Chevy truck 
29. ATV 
30. 1973 Dodge Challenger 
31. Bicycle 
AA. Miscellaneous Gun ammunition 
DD. Chickens 
EE. 1 Chicken Incubator 
GG. 2 red/blue mine lights + 2 base chrg 
II. 1 silver & gold wedding ring 
JJ. 1 almond whirlpool refrigerator 
KK. 1 Sharp stereo w/2 large speakers 
LL. 1 black file cabinet 
MM. 1 Stand for fish tank 
NN. 2 sand dune paddlewheel tires 
00. 2 men's 4-wheeler racing gloves 
PP. AT&T Telephone & Answering machine 
B. The following is list No. 2 and should be awarded to 
Defendant unless otherwise designated by Defendant except as may be 
substituted by Defendant as above indicated: 
1. Red plastic gas can 
2. Large older radio and 
phonograph in wood cabinet 
3. Tools - socket set 3/8 drive 
4. Wrenches - screwdrivers 
5. Large box of childrenfs books (new) 
6. Black metal rocking chair 
7. Power drill 
8. Space heater, bathroom scales (20 
9. All records, titles, deeds, tax papers 
receipts, etc. 
10. Electric jeep (1) Three wheeler (1) 
11. Blue sectional couch 
12. Large home stereo in wood cabinet 
13. Tan filing cabinet 
cw 
14. Four or five blankets 
15. Two handmade quilts 
16. 25 gallon fish tank 
17. Cassette tapes (100 at $8.00 ea) 
18. New Eureka vacuum 
19. 15-20 video movies 
20. New cassette player 
21. Phone 
22. Clock radio 
23. New dishes 
24. Green clean machine - carpet cleaner 
25. Family pictures 
26. Nice glasses 
26. Glass bowls 
27. New Smith-Corona Electronic typewriter 
28. New silverware in wood box 
29. Motorcycle helmet 
30. Bushnell Binoculars 
31. Minolta Camera 
32. Hitachi Camcorder 
33. Clothes hamper 
34. Cordless phone 
35. Battery charger 
36. Bicycle 
37. Answering machine 
38. Flashlights (2) 
39. Wall decorations 
40. Cherry wood jewelry box 
41. Captiva Camera 
42. Christmas decorations 
43. Ruger 989 9mm hand gun. 
44. 12 gauge shot gun 
45. Ruger 264 Magnum 
46. Ruger Mini 14-223 
47. Remington 22-250 
48. RCA VCR 
49. Oak coffee table 
50. Towels - sheets, etc. 
51. Plants and plant stands 
(brass and glass) 
52. Lamps 
53. End tables 
54. Kitchen table - four chairs 
55. Microwave 
56. Two dressers 
57. Compact discs (120 § $10.00 ea) 
58. Cannon 35 mm camera - 2 lenses and case 
59. Miscellaneous gun ammo 
60. Jumper cables 
61. 1988 Pontiac Grand Am 
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S. 12 Diamond Wedding Ring 
T. 4 Burial Plots 
U. 1 Blue Area Rug 
W. 1 baby book 
X. $800.00 cash taken from car by Plaint. 
Y. 1 black hills gold anniversary ring 
Z. 1 Pioneer home stereo (in La Verkin) 
AA. 2 sand dune paddlewheel tires 
BB. 2 women's 4 wheeler racing gloves 
1 Banshee ATV 
11. Defendant to Select Items: Defendant may select either 
list and from the property listed in her non-selected list, she may 
select six (6) items at the value indicated in the Findings of Fact 
and substitute any six (6) items from her selected list to replace 
the selected items. 
12. Increase of Defendants Personal Property List: Whichever 
list Defendant chooses shall be increased as follows: 
A. Guns 
Ruger 989 9mm hand gun 400.00 
12 gauge shot gun 350.00 
Ruger 264 Magnum 600.00 
Ruger Mini 14-223 600.00 
Remington 22-250 500.00 
Total $2,450.00 
B. Pontiac Grand Am $3,000.00 
13. Property Adiustment: To the extent that the Plaintiff 
receives a greater value of personal property after the Defendant's 
selection of the personal property as outlined above, the Plaintiff 
shall be allowed a credit of one-half of the value of all of the 
obligations he ultimately pays out-of-pocket against the personal 
property list thereby reducing the value of his list, visa vie the 
Defendant's list. This credit does not include insurance payments 
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made for doctors and/or hospitalization by Plaintiff's insurance 
carrier. 
After all adjustments required hereby the party receiving the 
greatest value of personal property shall pay to the other one-half 
of the difference in value. 
14. Cory's Property: The following items are Cory's items and 
shall remain with him: 
1. 1 Dresser 
2. Single Mattress 
3. Sega and Games 
4. Baby car seat 
5. 2 baseball bats 
6. 2 softball mitts 
7. 1 twin bed 
8. 1 baby swing 
9. 1 baby stroller 
10. Large box of children's books 
11. 1 Crib (sold in 1992) 
12. Cory's full size bed 
15. Name Change: The Defendant's maiden name of Olsen is 
hereby restored to her and she shall henceforth be known as "Lisa 
D. Olsen*. 
16. Inheritance: All property and property rights vested in 
either party as a result of family inheritance, trusts, or similar 
sources is hereby awarded to the party from whose family it came. 
17. Documents: Each party shall execute and deliver to the 
other any document necessary to implement the provisions of this 
Decree. 
18. Default: Should either party to this action default in any 
obligation imposed by this Decree, the party in default shall be 
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liable to the other for all reasonable expenses, including 
attorney's fees and costs, incurred in the enforcement of the 
obligations created by this Decree. 
19. Restraining Order: The parties are hereby permanently 
restrained and enjoined from bothering, harassing, annoying, 
threatening, or harming the other parent or the minor child at 
their place of residence, employment, school, or any other place. 
20. Debts; 
A. Plaintiff shall pay the following debts: 
1. Zions Bank Mastercard $2,237 
2. Zions Bank Visa 1,100 
3. Zions BAnk (Lumina) 9,000 
4. ORS 
5. Greentree Acceptance 
6. Desert View Credit Union 
(Grand Am Repair) 
7. Desert View Credit Union 
(Chevy Pickup) 
8. Discover Card 
9. Dr. Wayne Brown 
10. Dr. Jeffery Palen 
11. Southeastern Radiology 
12. Leo Hardy 
13. Utah Valley Medical Center 
14. Castle View Hospital 
15. Accounts Receivable Management 
16. Any debt incurred by him after separation on July 
28, 1995. 
B. The Defendant shall pay the following debts: 
1. Colonial Bank Mastercard 3,950; 
2. Castleview Hospital 
3. Any debt incurred by her after separation on July 
28, 1995 
4. To the extent that doctor bills are not paid by 
Plaintiff's insurance and to the extent that they were incurred 
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after the date of separation (July 28, 1995) Defendant shall pay 
same. 
21. Real Property: The real property and water shares are 
hereby awarded to the Plaintiff subject to a lien in favor of the 
Defendant concerning all payments required hereby from the 
Plaintiff to the Defendant. Plaintiff shall pay to the Defendant 
the sum of $3,240.00 as and for her interest in the real property. 
22. Loan: The Plaintiff shall pay to the Defendant one-half 
of the value of the amount withdrawn concerning the $8,500.00 loan 
to be paid at the rate of $100.00 per month no interest to be 
charged in the event the payments are made in timely fashion on or 
before the 5th day of each month beginning with the month following 
the Memorandum Decision. 
23. Alimony: Plaintiff shall pay to the Defendant the sum of 
$200.00 per month as and for alimony. Said payment shall continue 
for a period of five (5) years unless terminated earlier by order 
of the Court or operation of law. 
24. Retirement: Plaintiff is hereby awarded free and clear of 
any claim of the Defendant all of his retirement programs including 
any and all withdrawals made during the marriage, specifically 
including the $14,000.00 claimed by the Defendant. 
25. Life Insurance: Plaintiff shall continue any life 
insurance available to him through his employment on his life 
naming the child as beneficiary until the child reaches his 
majority. 
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26. Dr. Burgess: Plaintiff shall pay any balance due and 
owing to Dr. Burgess. 
27. Attorney's Fees: Plaintiff shall pay to the Defendant as 
and for attorney's fees t^r^sum of $5^000.00^ 
DATED this ^^y^fSiay of )?-f~Zfl^<-J , 1997. 
BRUCE K. HALLIDAY 
District Court 
\div\daley\decree\sm 
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JOHN E. SCHINDLER, #3619 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant, 
80 West Main, Suite 201 
Price, Utah 84501 
Telephone (801) 637-1783 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DANNY P. DALEY, 
Plaintiff/APPELLANT 
Vs. 
LISA D. DALEY, ) 
Defendant/APPELLEE, ; 
) CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
) Civil No. 970349CA 
I, John E. Schindler, hereby certify that on the 1 7 day of February, 1998,1 served 
a copy of the REPLY OF APPELLANT upon Paul G. Amann, the counsel for the Appellee, 
by mailing it to him by first class mail with sufficient postage prepaid to the following 
address: 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
DATED this / 7 day of February, 1998. 
